Competition in the German interurban bus industry : a snapshot two years after liberalization by Dürr, Niklas S. & Hüschelrath, Kai
Dis cus si on Paper No. 15-062
Competition in the German  
Interurban Bus Industry:  
A Snapshot  
Two Years After Liberalization
Niklas S. Dürr and Kai Hüschelrath
Dis cus si on Paper No. 15-062
Competition in the German  
Interurban Bus Industry:  
A Snapshot  
Two Years After Liberalization
Niklas S. Dürr and Kai Hüschelrath
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp15062.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
  
 
COMPETITION IN THE GERMAN INTERURBAN BUS INDUSTRY:  
A SNAPSHOT TWO YEARS AFTER LIBERALIZATION 
 
Niklas S. Dürr and Kai Hüschelrath 
 
August 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We study competition in the German interurban bus industry two years after its liberalization 
in January 2013. In addition to a brief characterization of the liberalization process and 
several general market developments, we provide a detailed analysis of selected market 
characteristics such as concentration and competitive interaction, fares as well as service 
quality. We use the gained insights to discuss two recent policy issues – industry 
consolidation and possible abuses of market power by incumbents – and derive several 
recommendations to secure effective competition in the industry.    
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1. Introduction  
Since the beginning of the deregulation movement in the 1970s in the United States, many 
regulated industries in a large number of countries have been liberalized1 – with so-called 
network industries being a major focus of such initiatives. By initiating and implementing 
deregulation processes, policy makers often aimed at increasing allocative and productive 
efficiency through the promotion of competition and – at the same time – reducing the 
amounts of subsidies paid to the respective sectors or industries. 
From an academic perspective, the transition from regulated to liberalized industries offers a 
rich set of research questions. Following a methodology by Perl (1997), focal points of 
interest have been research into the forces that have given rise to regulatory reform or the 
structures of the respective regulatory changes. The majority of research, however, focuses on 
the question after the effects of deregulation processes on key market outcome variables such 
as industry efficiency, prices or profits.  
For a few decades, the German interurban bus industry did not follow the described 
liberalization trends in most network industries in Europe. However, following constant 
pressures by especially the European Commission, in 2009, the German government 
announced plans to liberalize the national interurban bus market – defined as regular 
(scheduled) bus services above a distance of 50 kilometers. After a considerable transition 
period – in which the respective paragraphs of the Passenger Transport Act had to be changed 
– the industry was fully liberalized in January 2013. 
Against this background, we study competition in the German interurban bus industry two 
years after its liberalization. Following a brief characterization of the liberalization process 
and several general market developments since liberalization in Section 2, we provide a 
detailed analysis of selected market characteristics such as concentration and competitive 
interaction, fares as well as service quality in Section 3. Section 4 uses the gained insights to 
discuss two recent policy issues – industry consolidation and possible abuses of market power 
by incumbents – before we use the final Section 5 to derive several recommendations to 
secure effective competition in the industry.  
 
 
                                                     
1  In the remainder of this article, ‘deregulation’ and ‘liberalization’ are used as synonyms. 
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2. Liberalization of the German interurban bus industry 
In this section, we provide an initial characterization of the liberalization of the German 
interurban bus industry. A brief discussion of the liberalization process in Section 2.1 is 
followed by a more detailed description of general market developments since liberalization 
in Section 2.2. 
2.1. The liberalization process at a glance  
Although deregulation processes were initiated in many industries and countries in the last 
two to three decades, a mixture of public policy arguments and lobbying activities delayed the 
implementation of such processes in several sectors or industries. For Germany, this 
description applies to the interurban bus industry. Since 1931, bus companies were only 
allowed to offer regular interurban bus services – above a travel distance of 50 kilometers – 
on routes on which the state-owned German railway company Deutsche Bahn AG (or its 
predecessors) was unable to provide an acceptable service. Due to the rather dense 
(interurban) railway network in Germany, the respective law – that aimed at protecting a core 
business of Deutsche Bahn AG – led to only sporadic interurban bus services except for 
connections to/from former West Berlin (operated by Berlin Linien Bus) and international 
connections (by providers such as Eurolines Germany).  
The regulation of the German interurban bus industry remained intact until 2009 when the 
German government announced plans to liberalize the industry (responding to political 
pressures from the European Union). In the same year, three students established 
DeinBus.de2, a company which, whenever a sufficiently large number of travelers to a certain 
destination was found, rented a bus and offered the respective service. Additionally, Deutsche 
Bahn AG started to operate its own busses under the new IC Bus brand around the same time. 
Despite several attempts by different lobbying groups to prevent or at least weaken the 
deregulation of the industry, the German interurban bus industry was fully liberalized in 
January 2013 – after the respective paragraphs of the Passenger Transport Act3 were changed 
in the usual legislative (and lobbying) processes (see generally Maertens (2012) and 
Schiefelbusch (2013) for further information). 
 
 
                                                     
2  See https://www.DeinBus.de/ (last accessed on 22 March 2015). 
3  The most important change – leading to the liberalization of the interurban bus industry – referred to §13(2) 
Personenbeförderungsgesetz (‘Passenger Transport Act’) in which the strict entry regulations were codified. 
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2.2. General market developments after liberalization 
Prior experiences with deregulation processes in transport industries in general (see, e.g., 
Williams (1993), Morrison and Winston (1986, 1995) or Borenstein and Rose (2007) for the 
US airline industry) and interurban bus industries in particular (see, e.g., Robbins and White 
(1986, 2012) for Great Britain or Aarhaug et al. (2012) for Norway) would expect – at the 
early stages of a liberalized industry – substantial market entry by both new and incumbent 
firms leading either to the creation of new lines and routes or an increase in the number of 
competitors on existing lines and routes.  
The German interurban bus industry appears to follow this general pattern. Following full 
liberalization in January 2013 many providers decided to apply for an operating license. 
According to the German Office for Goods Transport (2014, p. 15), the number of licenses 
increased from 86 in December 2012 to 158 in June 2013 and finally 301 in September 2014 
(an overall increase of 350 percent). The increase in licenses is also reflected in an increase in 
both available lines and frequency of service on these lines. Comparing a week in August 
2013 with the same week in August 2014 reveals that the number of lines increased from 113 
to 244 (an increase of about 116 percent) while the number of journeys jumped from 2,360 to 
7,088 (an increase of about 300 percent; see German Office for Goods Transport (2014), p. 
17).  
A key strategy of most new entrants to the industry – such as especially MeinFernbus or 
FlixBus – to quickly extend their route networks was to avoid buying their own fleet but 
rather to develop a subcontractor-type business model in which already existing local bus 
companies agree to offer services under the respective (regional or national) interurban bus 
brand. At least in terms of market share gained, this strategy has proven successful as in 
August 2014 – on the basis of the number of offered routes – MeinFernbus was the market 
leader with a share of 29 percent, followed by FlixBus with 24 percent (see German Office for 
Goods Transport (2014), p. 18) and all remaining operators with substantially smaller market 
shares – partly because they entered the industry at a later point in time but partly also 
because they either concentrate on the provision of regional services or operate on a limited 
selection of lines with a particularly high demand.   
Despite the clear growth trend in the German interurban bus industry in the last two years, the 
overall size of the industry must still be considered as rather small. For example, according to 
data from the German Federal Statistical Office, 8.2 million passengers travelled (in sum 
about 2.7 billion passenger kilometers) by regular interurban busses in 2013, compared to 
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about 131 million passengers which travelled on long-distance railway connections in the 
same year.4 According to the most recent traffic forecast conducted by a consortium that was 
commissioned by the German Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (2014), 
a growth to about 25 million passengers (generating in sum about 8.8 billion passenger 
kilometers) is expected in the German interurban bus industry until the year 2030. 
3. Detailed analysis of selected market characteristics  
In this section, we provide a detailed analysis of selected characteristics of the German 
interurban bus market. Based on the description of our detailed route-level data set in Section 
3.1., we will especially shed light on concentration and competitive interaction (Section 3.2.), 
fares (Section 3.3.) as well as service quality (Section 3.4.). 
3.1. Construction of the data set 
The data set used in this article was constructed by merging data from different sources. The 
basic data set was obtained from http://www.fernbusse.de5, one of the leading online search 
engines for interurban bus travel in Germany for both national and international services.6 For 
all connections, the data set includes information on the date, time and city of origin and 
destination, duration, provider, included amenities, and price. For our analysis we restricted 
the data set to, first, connections within Germany and, second, to ‘large providers’ that offered 
at least 100 trips in the observation period from Tuesday, 11 November 2014 to Monday, 17 
November 2014. For this week, the data has been queried three times, 14 days, seven days, 
and one day prior to the respective day of departure. However, as the data (structure) are 
found not to vary to a larger extent across the three different queries, we use the data collected 
seven days before travel in this article (if not stated otherwise). Additionally, road distances 
between the respective origin and destination cities were retrieved from Google Maps.  
                                                     
4  Although in sum about 2.6 billion passengers travelled by rail in 2013, the large majority of about 2.5 billion 
passengers used local trains. As interurban busses by definition operate on medium- and long-haul routes 
only, it appears more appropriate to relate the 8.2 million bus customers to the 131 million long-distance rail 
customers. See https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Wirtschaftsbereiche/TransportVerkehr/Transport 
Verkehr.html (last accessed on 22 March 2015) for further information.  
5  See http://www.fernbusse.de (last accessed on 22 March 2015).  
6  Although it appears very likely that www.fernbusse.de contains the large majority of bus connections of (at 
least) all larger providers – justifying the use of the respective data for an analysis of the industry – it remains 
an open question how good the coverage of the connections available on the site is compared to the overall 
number of connections available in Germany during the respective observation period. Generally, it is 
reasonable to assume that competition between these platforms provides strong incentives for the respective 
operators to maximize the number of connections displayed – under the condition that the platforms operate 
independently and are not owned (or captured) by one or more providers of the respective bus services. 
Furthermore, industry studies are typically forced – for practical reasons – to restrict their analysis to firms 
above a certain size anyway and we therefore do not expect our results to underlie any significant (structural) 
biases. 
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Before we continue with a detailed characterization of selected market characteristics, it is 
important to clearly define our unit of analysis. Generally, three different levels of analysis 
can be differentiated: the line, the route and the connection (trip). A line is defined as an 
offered regular (scheduled) service from a particular origin (departure) city to a particular 
destination (arrival) city, e.g., from Hamburg to Munich. A line usually contains several stops, 
i.e., passengers are able to board the bus at a later city and/or get off the bus at an earlier city 
than the final destination. Each combination between two different stops on a line is defined 
as a route, i.e., if a line has N stops, the number of routes is ∑ ݅ேିଵ௜ୀଵ . The route is our unit of 
observation and analysis. In case a provider operates on a route in both directions, e.g., from 
Hamburg to Bremen and back to Hamburg – as it is usually the case – we count outward and 
inward trips as two separate routes as, first, in contrast to, e.g., airlines, bus tickets are 
typically sold separately for outward and inward journeys. Second, different modes of 
transport can be used by travelers for outward and inward trips – depending on the individual 
valuation of time and other trip costs – leading to potentially significant differences in 
demand (and price). Last but not least, it is important to remark that for all routes in our data 
set, we observe the number of connections (trips) per day and week. This information is 
important to, e.g., analyze the role of daily frequency of service as important strategic 
decision variable. In sum, our data set contains of 1822 routes with 40,568 route-level fare 
observations.  
Last but not least, it is important to clearly state the restriction of our data set to one week in 
November 2014. Although this week was chosen for no particular reason, it cannot be ruled 
out that, e.g., seasonal effects and/or other demand- or supply shocks might bias our results. 
Although there is no doubt that any findings or conclusions derived from such a cross section 
must therefore be handled with great care (and should not be generalized whatsoever), we 
believe that our analysis still provides important first insights on the inner workings of a 
recently liberalized industry. 
3.2. Concentration and competitive interaction 
A substantial amount of research in industrial organization is somehow related to market 
concentration and its impact on market conduct and market performance. Although especially 
more recent research has clearly questioned any deterministic relationship, few researchers 
would disagree that the study of market concentration is helpful to understand competition 
processes in an industry.  
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Although the analysis of market concentration and competition on the route-level will be the 
main focus of this section, transport markets by definition have a spatial dimension thereby 
raising the question after the general availability (and spatial concentration) of the respective 
services. Figure 1 therefore provides a map showing all 177 German cities in our data set with 
(at least one) interurban bus connection per week in November 2014. 
 
Figure 1: German cities with interurban bus connection (in November 2014) 
As shown in Figure 1, the large majority of connected cities – each represented by a small dot 
– are located in former West Germany which is largely driven by the substantially higher 
concentration of population – and therefore both higher actual and potential travel demand – 
in these areas of the country. The same reason is likely to drive the differences within former 
West Germany with a substantially larger number of connected cities in the South and the 
West compared to the North. Furthermore, Figure 1 allows – as indicated by the larger 
squares in combination with the printed city names – the identification of several focal cities, 
i.e., cities with an exceptionally large number of weekly departures. In November 2014, such 
cities with more than 1100 weekly departures were (in descending order) Berlin, Munich, 
Cologne, Hamburg, Dresden, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Hannover, Nuremberg, and Mannheim 
(i.e., exclusively large or very large cities in Germany). As connecting services – at least 
currently – do not play a significant role in the German interurban bus industry, the 
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concentration of traffic is largely driven by the large local demand (rather than the respective 
cities operating as hub cities for connecting services). 
Under the strong assumption that the German interurban bus industry constitutes an own 
relevant antitrust market7, a suitable starting point for a description of market concentration 
on the route-level is a simple analysis of the number of routes and the number of firms 
operating on these routes. Figure 2 below presents the respective results for the week in 
November 2014 that constitutes our data set.   
 
Figure 2: Number of routes differentiated by largest providers and number of 
competitors 
The left-hand chart in Figure 2 shows the number of (inner German, directional) interurban 
bus routes operated by the largest nine bus companies in November 2014. It is shown that the 
new entrants MeinFernbus (1288 routes), FlixBus (960 routes) and ADAC Postbus (556 
routes) have become the by far largest providers on the in sum 1822 routes within Germany 
leaving the incumbents such as Eurolines Germany (136 routes), DeinBus.de (111 routes), 
Berlin Linien Bus (111 routes) or IC Bus (18 routes; the latter two owned by Deutsche Bahn 
AG) with substantially smaller route presences. Interestingly, as all new entrants follow 
comparable subcontractor-type business models, the respective (firm) sizes – measured here 
in number of operated routes – can at least partly be explained by the respective times of 
entry: MeinFernbus entered first in April 2012, followed by FlixBus in February 2013, and 
                                                     
7  From an antitrust perspective, it remains an open question whether the German interurban bus market 
constitutes an own relevant market or must be considered as a (rather small) fraction of a much larger 
transportation market (possibly including car sharing agencies, railway services etc.). While the narrow 
delineation of the relevant market would (by construction) lead to high market shares and therefore 
competition concerns, the latter broader delineation is likely to result in the conclusion that anticompetitive 
effects are unlikely to exist. In this respect, it should also be taken into account that the demand for 
interurban bus travel must be considered as highly elastic and market entry barriers as rather low (thereby 
reducing the possibilities to abuse market power through the implementation of permanent price increases). 
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ADAC Postbus in October 2013.8 Berlin Linien Bus, Eurolines Germany, DeinBus.de and IC 
Bus were all active before 2013, however, they were constrained substantially in their growth 
by the existing regulations until January 2013. 
In addition to an analysis of the number of routes per provider, an important determinant of 
competition intensity on the route-level is the respective number of operating firms. The right-
hand chart in Figure 2 therefore shows the number of routes that are operated by one, two, 
three, four or five firms. It is revealed that the majority of 852 routes (out of in sum 1822 
routes, i.e., about 47 percent) is operated by only one provider, followed by two providers on 
609 routes (about 33 percent), three providers on 241 routes (about 13 percent), four providers 
on 90 routes (about 5 percent) and the maximum number of five providers on 30 routes (about 
1.6 percent).  
Despite the fact that the number of monopoly routes in the German interurban bus industry is 
found to be quite large, it is important to add that monopoly markets are typically expected to 
be rather small in terms of overall demand compared to routes on which a larger number of 
providers is operating. In other words, in most of the monopoly markets, competition is likely 
to be undesirable from a welfare perspective due to the respective small levels of overall 
demand on those routes. Figure 3 below provides some further insights in this respect by 
plotting the (absolute) number of connections (i.e., weekly trips) and well as the average trip 
length, both differentiated by the number of competitors.  
                                                     
8  MeinFernbus and FlixBus are both startups (supported by external investors), while ADAC Postbus is run by 
a consortium of the German automobile club ADAC and the (formerly state-owned but now privatized) 
German postal service (Deutsche Post AG). In November 2014, ADAC announced to end the consortium 
contract leaving the German postal service as the sole operator of the service.  
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Figure 3: Number of connections and average trip length differentiated by number of 
competitors 
As shown in the left-hand chart in Figure 3, markets with the lowest or highest number of 
competitors have substantially lower absolute numbers of connections in the week in 
November 2014 that constitutes our data set. While 5,234 trips were operated in monopoly 
markets, 4,379 trips took place in markets with five providers compared to 7,468 connections 
in markets with four providers. The majority of about 58 percent of all connections, however, 
is conducted in duopoly (11,880 trips) and triopoly (11,607 trips) markets. However, relating 
the respective number of connections to the absolute number of routes in the respective 
categories reveal that monopoly routes have on average only 6.1 weekly trips per route while 
the respective values increase to 19.5 weekly trips for duopoly routes, 48.2 weekly trips for 
triopoly routes and 124.5 and 146.0 weekly trips per route on markets with four or five 
competitors, respectively. These results therefore confirm the expectation above that routes 
with more competitors – although rather small in absolute numbers – are of great importance 
when studying the overall significance and impact of the industry. 
Turning to the right-hand chart in Figure 3 above, the average trip length for the five route 
categories is shown. It is revealed that the highest average distance of 335 kilometer is found 
on routes that are served by three providers while both the least and most competitive routes 
have substantially lower average distances of 275 km for monopoly routes and 260 km for 
routes with five competitors. Furthermore, although not shown in the chart, our analysis 
revealed that FlixBus offers the longest connections with about 304 kilometers on average, 
however, closely followed by MeinFernbus and ADAC Postbus with 303 km and 298 km (on 
average), respectively. Smaller providers with correspondingly smaller networks, however, 
are found to have lower average distances with muenchenlinie.de and DeinBus.de being at the 
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end of the spectrum with an average trip length of (on average) 182 km and 170 km, 
respectively.  
Although the number of competitors at the route-level is likely to be an important determinant 
of market competition (and fares), research in industrial economics also suggests that the 
degree of competitive interaction can have an important effect on market conduct and market 
performance. For example, providers that meet on many routes may behave differently than 
providers who interact on a couple of routes only. In order to allow a more detailed study of 
these relationships for the German interurban bus industry, Table 1 shows a matrix of 
monopoly routes and the number of overlaps on competitive routes (i.e., routes with more 
than one provider). 
Table 1: Matrix of monopoly routes and overlaps on competitive routes 
Mein  
Fernbus FlixBus 
ADAC  
Postbus 
Berlin  
Linien Bus
DeinBus. 
de 
Eurolines 
Germany OneBus 
muenchen 
linie.de IC Bus 
Mein Fernbus 451 691 343 144 115 205 67 4 12 
FlixBus 691 159 671 109 241 180 65 0 14 
ADAC Postbus 343 671 136 52 57 155 61 0 4 
Berlin Linien Bus 144 109 52 42 0 12 0 0 4 
DeinBus.de 115 241 57 0 29 10 22 3 0 
Eurolines Germany 205 180 155 12 10 18 15 0 0 
OneBus 67 65 61 0 22 15 11 0 0 
muenchenlinie.de 4 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 
IC Bus 12 14 4 4 0 0 0 0 2 
Note: Number of monopoly routes in shaded cells; number of competitive routes in remaining cells 
Starting off with a discussion of monopoly routes, Table 1 shows that MeinFernbus (451 
routes) has the largest number of monopoly routes, followed by FlixBus (159 routes) and 
ADAC Postbus (136 routes). All other providers have substantially smaller numbers of 
monopoly routes. Turning to the overlaps on competitive routes, MeinFernbus and FlixBus 
meet most often (on in total 691 routes). An almost equally high number of 671 overlaps is 
found for FlixBus and ADAC Postbus (while MeinFernbus only competes with ADAC 
Postbus on 343 routes). Ceteris paribus, these findings suggest that FlixBus is facing greater 
competitive pressures than MeinFernbus. All remaining providers are substantially smaller 
thereby showing a correspondingly reduced number of both monopoly routes and competitive 
route overlaps.  
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3.3. Fares 
The level of fares is an important measure of both market conduct and market performance. 
On the one hand, firms actively develop pricing strategies trying to outsmart their competitors 
(leading to increased revenues and eventually profits). On the other hand, fares influence the 
size of the aggregated consumer surplus realized by the respective market or industry. 
Generally, fares can be studied by presenting various breakdowns of the raw data. In the 
following, we restrict our analysis to a discussion of average prices differentiated by largest 
providers and number of competitors, day and time of booking as well as trip distance (haul).  
A straightforward way to start a characterization of fares is two compare the major providers 
in the market with respect to their average fares. Although it is obvious that the calculation of 
such average prices hide much information – especially with respect to route-specific 
differences – it still allows an initial classification of providers. An important precondition for 
the calculation of average prices is to derive a suitable measure. Although on the surface, 
‘price per kilometer’ appears to be the measure of choice, frequent stops – requiring 
additional kilometers by leaving the highway to reach the respective bus stops in the inner 
cities – can bias this measure. In Figure 4 below, we therefore not only report the standard 
‘price per kilometer’ measure but also the ‘price per minute’ as alternative measure for our 
descriptive analysis.    
 
Figure 4: Average prices differentiated by largest providers and number of competitors 
The left-hand chart in Figure 4 plots the average prices of the nine largest providers and 
reveals substantial between-firm variation. While muenchenlinie.de is the most expensive 
provider on a price per kilometer (0.087 EUR/km) as well as price per minute (0.112 
EUR/min) basis, the three largest providers MeinFernbus, FlixBus, and ADAC Postbus 
apparently offer relatively low average prices. The cheapest provider is DeinBus.de with an 
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average price of 0.046 EUR/km or 0.052 EUR/min, respectively. Interestingly, the two 
companies owned by the (state-owned) provider of railway services Deutsche Bahn AG – 
Berlin Linien Bus and IC Bus – are relatively expensive providers with 0.076 EUR/km (0.096 
EUR/min) or 0.075 EUR/km (0.092 EUR/min), respectively. As main service quality drivers 
appear rather similar between the different providers (as, e.g., most offer services such as free 
Wi-Fi on board, free luggage, snacks, bike transport, restrooms etc.), the observed differences 
might either reflect different cost structures (e.g., due to different general business concepts or 
different technical specificities of the respective route portfolios (e.g., in terms of average 
travel distances)) and/or different pricing strategies (partly driven by a varying importance of 
brand recognition etc.). 
In addition to the identified variation of average fares on the provider level, our discussion of 
market concentration in the preceding section suggests that average prices should fall with an 
increasing number of firms on the respective routes. The right-hand chart of Figure 3 
therefore plots the average prices differentiated by the number of firms operating on the 
respective routes. Supporting main insights of Cournot-type oligopoly models, average prices 
are highest (with an average of 0.059 EUR/km or 0.064 EUR/min) if only one provider is 
operating on the respective route and decrease significantly if a second (0.055 EUR/km or 
0.063 EUR/min) and third operator (0.049 EUR/km or 0.058 EUR/min) is present. A fourth 
and fifth provider, however, do not have any additional (larger) effect on average prices in the 
respective markets.  
Another breakdown of fare data that is likely to generate interesting further insights is a 
differentiation by days of the week and time of booking. Generally, it can on the one hand be 
expected that an effective yield management together with varying absolute demand levels is 
reflected in price differences (leading to higher prices in times of high demand and vice 
versa). On the other hand, experiences with yield management systems in other network 
industries (such as, e.g., airlines) raise the expectation that the time of booking has a 
measurable effect on the average fare paid. Ceteris paribus, it can be expected that bookings 
in advance are cheaper than last minute bookings on the day before the departure. Figure 5 
below allows an investigation of both issues.  
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Figure 5: Average prices differentiated by days of the week and time of booking 
As shown in the left-hand chart in Figure 5 (for bookings 7 days in advance), the weekdays of 
high demand – Friday and Sunday – do show higher average prices than the other days of the 
week. In fact, focusing on the price per minute reveals that average prices on Friday (0.057 
EUR/km or 0.065 EUR/min) and Sunday (0.061 EUR/km or 0.070 EUR/min) are about 12.28 
percent (12.5 percent) or 18.03 percent (18.3 percent), respectively, higher than the average of 
0.050 EUR/km (0.057 EUR/min) for the remaining five days of the week. Furthermore, as 
revealed by the right-hand chart in Figure 5, the price pattern between a booking 14 days in 
advance, seven days in advance and one day in advance looks very similar. While the change 
from 14 to 7 days in advance only leads to the addition of a rather small price premium of on 
average about 6 percent on the two days of high demand (Friday and Sunday), the change 
from seven days to 1 day does show measurable price increases on all days (on average about 
12 percent), however, with the premiums on the two days of high demand being substantially 
larger (on average about 19 percent). 
A final rather traditional way to study fares in a transport market is to analyze differences by 
haul. Generally, such differences – sometimes related to so-called economies of distance – 
occur as soon as either (trip-specific) fixed costs are shared over a longer trip or certain cost 
components increase at a lower rate with an increase in trip length. Furthermore, transport 
companies frequently use haul to implement price differentiation strategies (that might even 
include a cross-subsidization of long-haul routes by short-haul routes; see, e.g., Button 
(2010)). Figure 6 below allows studying these relationships between average/actual prices and 
haul in greater detail. 
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Figure 6: Average prices and actual prices differentiated by haul 
As shown by the left-hand chart in Figure 6, a separation into ultra short-haul (50-150 km), 
short-haul (151-300 km), medium-haul (301-600 km) and long-haul (over 600 km)9 leads to 
the expected stepwise reductions in average prices on both a per kilometer and per minute 
basis. While, e.g., the average ultra short-haul price is found to be 0.066 EUR/km (or 0.074 
EUR/min), the corresponding value for long-haul connections is 0.041 EUR/km (or 0.046 
EUR/min), i.e., a reduction of 0.025 EUR/km (or about 38 percent). In addition to the analysis 
of average values, the right-hand chart in Figure 6 gives a detailed overview by plotting all 
available (route-level) average price-distance combinations available in our data set. The 
revealed parabolic relationship is in accordance with comparable earlier studies for, e.g., the 
airline or trucking industries and likely reflects the initially discussed cost- and demand-
related specificities of transport markets.      
3.4. Service quality  
In addition to pricing, service quality is another strategic decision variable in the competition 
between different interurban bus providers. Generally, measuring service quality certainly is a 
multidimensional problem with some (rather objective) service quality drivers being relatively 
easy to quantify (so-called quantitative indicators) and other (rather subjective) drivers with 
substantial problems in measuring them accurately (so-called qualitative indicators). Although 
it is not always easy to clearly separate between the two set of drivers, few would disagree 
that frequency of service is a quantitative indicator. Ceteris paribus, the more connections per 
day are offered on a particular route, the more likely that the desired travel day and time of the 
passenger is close to the actual scheduled travel times (thereby increasing consumer welfare). 
Furthermore, a higher daily frequency suggest more intensive competition on the respective 
                                                     
9  The, in sum, 1822 routes in our data set are allocated to the respective haul categories as follows: ultra-short 
haul: 366 routes, short-haul: 601 routes, medium-haul: 740 routes and long haul: 115 routes. 
15 
 
route – basically because high daily frequencies are only provided for markets with a 
sufficiently high demand (potential) and this high demand (potential) is likely to attract entry 
by other providers. Figure 7 below provides an overview of the average daily frequencies 
differentiated by both largest providers and number of competitors.    
 
Figure 7: Daily frequency differentiated by largest providers and number of competitors 
As revealed by the left-hand chart in Figure 7, IC Bus offers the highest daily frequencies on 
their routes – reaching an average value of 3.650 daily connections – followed by 
MeinFernbus with on average 3.275 daily connections. The other end of the spectrum – 
offering the lowest number of average daily connections – is occupied by Eurolines Germany 
and OneBus who both rarely operate (on average) more than once per day on a connection.  
As daily frequencies are likely to change with market size (and market size in turn affects the 
probability of entry), the right-hand chart in Figure 7 provides the respective breakdown of 
daily frequencies by number of firms in the market and further differentiates between the 
three largest providers in terms of overall market share – MeinFernbus, FlixBus and ADAC 
Postbus – and the remaining providers. As shown in the chart, overall daily frequencies 
increase – as expected – with the number of competitors on the respective routes. 
Furthermore, it is revealed that MeinFernbus on average provides substantially higher daily 
frequencies – across all three different market structures – than its two toughest competitors 
FlixBus and ADAC Postbus.  
Complementary to frequency of service as quantitative service level indicator, many other 
quantitative or qualitative factors influence overall service quality. Examples include the 
availability and quality of certain additional services (such as, e.g., free Wi-Fi on board, free 
luggage, snacks, bike transport or restrooms), the punctuality of the service or even mostly 
subjective drivers such as seat comfort, cleanliness of the restrooms etc. A usual way to 
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handle the issue of a multitude of different service quality factors is the construction of a 
service quality rating that combines at least some key indicators into one final rating value per 
provider. Although necessarily imperfect, in this article, we use the results of a (general, not 
route-specific) quality rating provided by http://www.fernbusse.de. The overall rating is 
derived by calculating the mean of the following three rating categories: bus comfort, service 
level, and punctuality. For all three categories, users of http://www.fernbusse.de were asked to 
rate a provider on a one-to-five star basis (with 5 stars being the best outcome). The respective 
average values – obtained from the webpage on 19 December 2014 – are shown in the left-
hand chart in Figure 8 below. 
 
Figure 8: Average service quality differentiated by largest providers and price-service 
quality matrix 
As shown in Figure 8, DeinBus.de provides the highest service quality (4.50 stars) – along the 
dimensions included into the rating – followed by IC Bus (4.42 stars) and muenchenlinie.de 
(3.83 stars). At the other end of the spectrum, we find OneBus (2.75 stars) and Eurolines 
Germany (3.00 stars) with the lowest rating values. Last but not least, the availability of price 
and service level data suggests a final categorization of the major players along these two key 
dimensions of competitive interaction. The respective results – using the data plotted in 
Figure 4 and Figure 8 (left-hand charts) – are shown in the price-service quality matrix in the 
right-hand chart in Figure 8 above. The matrix generally reveals substantial differences 
between most of the nine largest providers in the German interurban bus market. While 
several providers such as OneBus or FlixBus rather follow a low price-low quality strategy, 
other providers such as IC Bus or muenchenlinie.de offer rather expensive premium services. 
Eurolines Germany appears to have a rather difficult position with relatively high prices but a 
relatively low level of service quality. However, the rather international focus of the company 
might explain part of the disadvantageous position when concentrating on routes within 
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Germany only. Last but not least, the almost identical positions of MeinFernbus and ADAC 
Postbus in the price-service quality matrix suggest rather intensive competitive interaction 
between both companies. The same conclusion – however to a lesser extent – is true for the 
relationship of both companies to FlixBus.    
4. Recent policy issues  
Guided by the detailed analysis of selected market characteristics in the preceding section, we 
now turn to a discussion of recent policy issues. In particular, we use our data set to shed light 
on the potential effects of recent industry consolidations and potential abuses of market power 
by incumbents. 
4.1. Industry consolidation 
Following substantial market entry activity by either new or incumbent firms at the early 
stages of a liberalized industry, it can subsequently be expected that both shrinking growth 
potentials over time as well as business concepts that turn out to be less successful than others 
will cause a consolidation phase in which less efficient firms will have to leave the industry 
either through liquidation or merger. 
Despite the fact that the German interurban bus industry was deregulated quite recently, 
several consolidation events have already been observed. For example, in October 2014, the 
rather small (but financially powerful) provider City2City – a subsidiary of UK’s National 
Express – went out of business and in November 2014, DeinBus.de entered the state of 
bankruptcy protection, however, continues to operate for the time being. Very recently and 
most importantly, in January 2015, the two biggest players in the market – MeinFernbus and 
FlixBus – announced their plans to merge. Although the small absolute size of the German 
interurban bus market makes it unlikely that the German Federal Cartel Office will investigate 
the proposed transaction (basically because the respective worldwide/domestic turnover 
thresholds set out in merger control are not reached), the announced merger still raises the 
question after its competitive effects in general and its price effects in particular. This is 
especially the case as such a merger between the two by far largest providers – in an industry 
still in its infancy – can certainly have a substantial impact on its future development. 
Generally, in order to assess the competitive effects of the announced merger, it is important 
to analyze not only the number of routes operated by both carriers but especially the degree of 
overlap between both merging firms prior to the merger and the corresponding (potential) 
differences in average prices charged and daily frequencies offered (assuming that price and 
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daily frequency are key competition variables). Furthermore, a merger between two leading 
firms in a network industry is likely to affect the respective business strategies in general and 
the respective pricing strategies in particular suggesting a more detailed pre-merger 
assessment.  
Again using our route-level data set of one week in November 2014, the initial descriptive 
analysis of route presence above revealed that MeinFernbus operated on 1288 routes 
compared to FlixBus with 960 routes. Interestingly, both players competed directly on 691 
routes from which they are the only two providers on 348 routes (i.e., a monopoly market will 
result post-merger). Figure 9 below offers several further insights on the average daily 
frequencies and average prices of the merging parties compared to the remaining providers on 
the respective routes.  
 
Figure 9: Daily frequencies and average prices of merging parties compared to other 
large providers10 
The left-hand chart in Figure 9 presents the daily frequencies by number of competitors and 
differentiates between MeinFernbus, FlixBus and other providers. As expected, the average 
number of daily frequencies increases substantially with the number of competitors. More 
importantly, the chart reveals that MeinFernbus offers on average much higher daily 
frequencies than both FlixBus and the other providers. This not only leads to an increase in 
service quality (as more departures reduce the time span between the desired departure time 
and the actual departure time for the customers) but also promotes the company goal of 
MeinFernbus to become (or stay, respectively) the leading interurban bus brand in Germany.  
Turning from daily frequencies to a second key competition variable in interurban bus 
markets, namely price, the right-hand chart in Figure 9 on the one hand generally shows the 
                                                     
10  The figure largely follows Dürr et al. (2015). 
19 
 
decreasing average price trend associated with an increase in the number of competitors. 11 In 
line with the results reported in Figure 4 above, average prices are found to be highest (with 
an average of 0.059 EUR/km or 0.064 EUR/min) if only one provider is operating on the 
respective route and decrease significantly if a second (0.055 EUR/km or 0.063 EUR/min) 
and third operator (0.049 EUR/km or 0.058 EUR/min) is present. However, as revealed by the 
right-hand chart in Figure 9, the respective averages are hiding substantial between-firm 
variation as the breakdown between the merging parties and other providers found FlixBus 
(0.051 EUR/km or 0.056 EUR/min) to charge lower monopoly fares than MeinFernbus (0.058 
EUR/km or 0.061 EUR/min).  However, the average prices of both firms are clearly below the 
average prices of the remaining providers operating in the industry (0.067 EUR/km, 0.073 
EUR/min). 
Turning from monopoly to duopoly markets, it is shown that duopolies in which only other 
providers are operating (0.059 EUR/km, 0.070 EUR/min) charge similar prices than FlixBus 
(0.063 EUR/km or 0.070 EUR/min) or MeinFernbus duopolies (0.061 EUR/km or 0.067 
EUR/min). Most importantly, however, routes on which the two merging parties directly 
compete against each other show the lowest average prices of about 0.051 EUR/km (0.059 
EUR/min)12 thereby suggesting noticeable (at least short-term) prices increases post-merger.  
Interestingly, the picture partly changes if triopoly markets are analyzed. Now, FlixBus routes 
(0.051 EUR/km or 0.059 EUR/min) show lower average prices than MeinFernbus triopoly 
routes (0.057 EUR/km or 0.076 EUR/min) while routes in which both merging parties operate 
still show an average price below the two former (0.049 EUR/km or 0.056 EUR/min). 
Although these descriptive findings already point towards substantial differences in the 
pricing strategy of the merging parties, it is obvious that these descriptive results must be 
handled with great care – especially because they do not control for other potential drivers of 
price differences (see Dürr et al. (2015) for an investigation in a more sophisticated 
econometric framework). 
                                                     
11  The absolute numbers of routes in the respective categories are as follows: Monopoly MFB 451 routes, 
Monopoly FB 159 routes, Monopoly others 242 routes; Duopoly MFB 140 routes, Duopoly FB 98 routes, 
Duopoly MFB-FB 348 routes, Duopoly others 23 routes; Triopoly MFB 6 routes, Triopoly FB 12 routes, and 
Triopoly MFB-FB 223 routes. 
12  Although these differences, on the surface, appear to be negligible, they are in fact quite substantial. 
Assuming an average interurban bus trip length of 296.87 kilometers, the customer would face an average 
price of about 296.87 km * 0.061 EUR/km = 18.10 EUR in markets with presence of FlixBus only, compared 
to an average price of only 296.87 km * 0.051 EUR/km = 15.14 EUR in markets in which both merging 
parties are operating (i.e., an about 16.4 percent cheaper price). 
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In sum, although our descriptive results suggest (at least short-term) post-merger price 
increases for at least several groups of customers, for a number of reasons (beyond the general 
necessity of an econometric analysis) these findings do not allow the immediate conclusion 
that the merger should be classified as anticompetitive. First, from an antitrust perspective, it 
remains unclear whether the German interurban bus market constitutes an own relevant 
market or must be considered as a (rather small) fraction of a much larger transportation 
market (possibly including car sharing agencies, railway services etc.). Second, although our 
empirical results suggest short-term price increases, realized merger efficiencies might 
(partly) be passed-on to consumers through price reductions in the medium and long run. 
Furthermore, other providers of bus services might specifically enter markets in which market 
power has increased post-merger (and positive profits can be earned). Last but not least, it has 
been argued by industry experts (see, e.g., German Office for Goods Transport (2014), pp. 
26ff.) that the current price levels in the industry do not allow making permanent positive 
profits. It is therefore partly believed that industry consolidation and a corresponding 
reduction of competitive pressures, e.g., through the proposed merger, is necessary to reach a 
sustainable long-term industry equilibrium. Due to the absence of detailed (firm-level) cost 
(and profit) data, we are unable to investigate the correctness (and relevance) of this argument 
any further. 
4.2. Possible abuses of market power by incumbents 
Complementary to the recent concentration activities among successful new entrants in the 
industry discussed in the previous section, the issue of potential abuses of market power by 
incumbents has been raised by new entrants on a regular basis. In particular, it has been 
argued that the incumbent railway company Deutsche Bahn AG is likely to misuse its market 
power in the railway market to distort competition in the interurban bus industry through their 
subsidiary company IC Bus. Although the allegations are multifaceted, a key concern of some 
new entrants are possible attempts by IC Bus to gain market share and eventually monopolize 
at least parts of the interurban bus market through low price ‘predation’ strategies.   
In order to investigate whether our data supports such low price strategies by particularly IC 
Bus, we have to differentiate between two analytical steps. First, we have to compare the 
average prices on IC Bus routes with the average prices on other routes. Second, we have to 
investigate whether the prices set by IC Bus itself are noticeably lower than the prices set by 
the other providers operating on these routes. Figure 10 below presents the descriptive results 
for both sets of questions. 
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Figure 10: Average prices and price-setting strategies on IC Bus routes 
As shown in the left-hand chart in Figure 10, routes with a presence of IC Bus have on 
average higher prices on both a per kilometer and a per minute basis than other (non-
monopoly) routes (without the presence of IC Bus). Although descriptive in nature, these 
results speak against a particular low price ‘predation’ strategy of IC Bus. This basic 
conclusion is strengthened further if a differentiation between the average price set by IC Bus 
and the average price set by the other providers on the respective IC Bus routes is introduced. 
As revealed by the right-hand chart in Figure 10, the direct competitors of IC Bus set (on 
average) substantially lower prices than IC Bus itself. Although IC Bus is providing a higher 
quality product, it appears unlikely that the respective prices can be used as evidence for an 
anticompetitive behavior by IC Bus in the form of setting unusually low ‘below cost’ prices. 
In fact, it is the competitors of IC Bus that decided to price (on average) substantially lower 
on routes where IC Bus is present than on other routes. Without having any specific 
information on the motivations behind these pricing strategies, one possible explanation is 
that especially the new (but already powerful) recent entrants to the industry see IC Bus as a 
key danger to their future developments thereby deciding to (preemptively) set very low 
prices on routes where they directly compete against IC Bus.   
From a more general perspective, it would also be premature to conclude from the fact that we 
did not find evidence for a predatory behavior of IC Bus that anticompetitive moves by the 
incumbent(s) have never appeared (and will never appear in the future). In addition to the 
important limitations of our study – being able to analyze prices of one leading online search 
engine for one week in November 2014 only – incumbents typically have more than one 
possibility to ‘raise rivals’ costs’ and therefore to make the life of new entrants less pleasant. 
Examples include incumbency advantages in online booking – especially by being able to 
include IC Bus connections into the online railway booking tool of Deutsche Bahn AG – or 
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preferred access to infrastructure facilities such as bus stations at (or near) the respective main 
railway stations. In that respect, it is therefore an important task of the German Federal Cartel 
Office not only to keep eyes and ears open for complaints by new entrants on possible forms 
of anticompetitive behavior by incumbent firms but also to be prepared to intervene in cases 
of sufficiently clear violations of competition law.   
5. Conclusion 
In this article, we have studied competition in the German interurban bus industry two years 
after its liberalization in January 2013. In addition to a brief characterization of the 
liberalization process and several general market developments, we have provided a detailed 
analysis of selected market characteristics such as concentration and competitive interaction, 
fares as well as service quality. We further used the gained insights to study and discuss two 
recent policy issues – industry consolidation and possible abuses of market power by 
incumbents.  
Having in mind the limitations of our route-level data set – that only comprises detailed price 
and frequency information of one leading online search engine for one week in November 
2014 – our results do support the hypothesis that competition in the German interurban bus 
industry is workable (and working). After liberalization, frequent firm and route entries have 
been observed leading to a quick extension of the respective route networks with the new 
entrants gaining the by far largest share of the market. Route-level concentration is – as 
suggested by standard Cournot-type oligopoly models – a key driver of the realized fare level 
(with lower average fares being realized on more competitive routes). Daily frequencies and 
service quality are identified as two other key competition variables that show substantial 
between-firm variation (reflecting different business strategies of the nine largest providers 
included into our analysis).  
Furthermore, although our purely descriptive analysis suggest (short-term) price increases in 
the aftermath of recent industry consolidation events, it appears rather unlikely that (merger- 
or liquidation-induced) increases in market concentration will allow non-transitory increases 
in price. This has especially to do with the currently rather low level of entry barriers in 
combination with the largely price-elastic demand (that it likely to face several forms of 
intermodal competition by, e.g., car sharing agencies or railway services). With respect to the 
second policy issue discussed in this article – a possible misuse of market power by the 
incumbent Deutsche Bahn AG through its subsidiary company IC Bus – we did not find any 
supporting evidence for such a form of anticompetitive ‘predatory’ behavior. In fact, the 
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competitors of IC Bus appear to set substantially lower prices on routes with IC Bus presence 
compared to other routes. However, the absence of any evidence for predatory behavior of IC 
Bus does not allow the conclusion that incumbents will generally abstain from an 
implementation of so-called raising rival’s cost strategies. As a consequence, the German 
Federal Cartel Office is well advised to keep eyes and ears open for complaints by new 
entrants about possible forms of anticompetitive behavior by incumbent firms. 
From a more general perspective, it appears particularly important for the future development 
of the industry to assure that potential barriers to market entry in general and route entry in 
particular remain low. Taking experiences from other network industries into account, 
especially the access to existing infrastructure components – first and foremost the bus 
stations in the respective cities but also, e.g., feeder roads from the city centers to the 
highways (and vice versa) – must be granted on a transparent and non-discriminatory basis. 
Complementary, the extension of such infrastructure components must be considered as well 
– as soon as capacity limits become binding for a sufficient large fraction of the day, the 
week, the month or the year – in order to be able to realize further growth potentials and to 
keep interurban bus markets open for market entry and competition. Such competition is not 
only likely to discipline pricing behavior in the interurban bus industry itself but will also 
create important knock-on effects on the pricing behavior in adjacent industries – such as 
railways or car sharing agencies – which are likely to directly compete for the same group of 
(price-sensitive) customers.     
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